A Scramble for Africa: Beating the Wagner Group
It would be hard to devise a more complicated geo-political plot than the one playing out now in North and Central Africa. And about to enter center stage is an organization that has become a malign standard bearer for Russian foreign policy: the Wagner Group.
In the Sahel, the region immediately below the Sahara in the western and central part of the continent, a constellation of extremist groups affiliated with the Islamic State and al Qaeda, are fighting an insurgency against the governments of four countries. In 2013, the French government sent a task force to Mali in an effort to undermine these groups and help restore stability, but President Macron recently announced French plans to withdraw these troops in the next year. In the last 8 months, the United States has pulled almost all its troops out of Niger, leaving no significant US military presence in the region. With the security situation worsening, these departures leave a void.
Enter the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company which has steadily been gaining a foothold on the continent, in places like Libya, Mozambique, the Central African Republic and the Sudan where it has earned a reputation for incompetence and brutality. It was the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, who announced to the United Nations the news about Mali’s overture to the Group. A surprising development perhaps in light of recent media reports which – even allowing for some inaccuracy – suggest that the Group’s activities are anything but above board.
A French paper recently published a story alleging that the Wagner Group received funding from the Algerian government, a close ally of the Kremlin’s – an accusation which the Algerians deny. Then there is the perhaps related case of the two Moroccan truck drivers, who were murdered in Mali last August. Eye-witness descriptions of the incident indicate that the assassination was, in terms of arms, equipment and methodology, reminiscent of a Wagner Group operation. There was even speculation in North African papers that the Wagner Group was acting on behalf of the Algerian government – a line of inquiry that has not been pursued by the Moroccans.
Then, in September, the President of Mali, Assime Goita, reached out to the Wagner Group for assistance. France and the United States are displeased by this offer, recognizing that the infusion of 1000 Russian mercenaries into the Sahel is unlikely to have a positive effect.
There is no reason, however, that Assime Goita and the Wagner Group should become a problem for the United States or France. A pragmatic solution lies at hand, but it will involve some concerted carrot and stick diplomacy.
Goita is in a precarious position. A former Army colonel, he rose to his position as a result of a coup and was given the title of interim president by a constitutional court on condition that he prepares the country for elections. No country wants to become an international pariah – and Mali is among the least prepared to do so. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, heavily dependent on foreign aid. The UN mission in Mali has already announced its intention of leaving if the Wagner Group is allowed to operate in the country. These facts alone won’t dissuade a man like Goita, unless he can show some gain. Here the combined resources and expertise of the United States and France can offer options well beyond the range of a shoddy organization such as the Wagner Group — by taking a page from the Russian playbook, but with a more enlightened approach to outsourcing security assistance.
Simply providing troops will achieve little unless it is part of an overarching strategy aimed at depriving extremist groups of their appeal to the local population. To this end, the US government should offer to provide funding on the condition that the Malian government adopt a combined US/French contracted program of assistance. This would include strategic level consulting with a focus on defeating extremist threats and restoring stability. Concurrent objectives would include a return to democratic elections and alleviating poverty through sustainable economic viability. If this all sounds unrealistic, then consider the alternative – an indefinite commitment to providing economic life support, much of which is dissipated by corruption and inefficiency.
At the same time, reputable companies would be contracted to augment an operational through tactical advisory effort for the Malian security forces. While civilian contractors focused on building capacity – the people and processes that will make the Malian security forces a functioning institution — a relatively small group of Coalition advisors would accompany and assist Malian units in the field. France would need to provide air support but could downscale its task force to a relatively small advisory effort.
The cost would be purely financial – but bear in mind that France and the United States already contribute over $200 million a year to Mali with questionable effect. This would provide a more focused use of financial assistance.
One point often forgotten in making these policy decisions is the cost of taking no action.
The continued strengthening of militant groups in Mali and their spread to neighboring countries would allow al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates to establish a new safe haven and destabilize the region. In addition, northern Mali remains a central transit point for migrants looking for ways to reach Europe. The weak economy and lack of job prospects in northern Mali has led many to turn to the trafficking and smuggling of migrants and drugs as a primary source of income. This crisis already has spill over effects that reach far beyond the borders of the Sahel and threatens to do worse.
It would be far better to learn from our adversaries by taking such an approach, then to simply issue demarches while the Wagner Group injects its own brand of chaos into an already volatile situation. And who knows? If successful, this might prove to be a useful template for a form of US foreign policy that exerts considerable influence without invoking the specters of nation building or forever wars. More by the Author
